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INTRODUCTION 
In act three, scene two of The Tempest, Stephano, a 
drunken steward, has just crowned himself mock-king of the 
island on which he and his master are stranded.  He hears 
music, but he cannot tell where the music is coming from.  
“This will prove a brave kingdom to me,” he says, “where I shall 
have my music for nothing.”1 
Like Stephano, millions of Internet users stand amazed at 
the variety of music available to them “for nothing.”  
Technology has made instant distribution of music to home 
computers widely available.  Most people do not pay for their 
downloads.  The peer-to-peer file sharing world teeters on the 
edge of legitimacy.  Users are unsure of whether to start paying 
for music or keep downloading with hope the music will keep 
playing. 
The instability of the current peer-to-peer file sharing 
situation, is captured by the story of Brianna LaHara.2  After 
using KaZaA to share her favorite songs, Brianna was sued for 
copyright infringement, and she settled for $2,000.3  Brianna is 
twelve years old.4  What combination of fear, desperation, and 
hubris could drive the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA) to sue a child on behalf of its member record 
companies? 
The answer is the popularity of peer-to-peer file sharing.  
Among young music fans, peer-to-peer file sharing (“P2P”) is an 
exceedingly popular way to consume music.  For some, P2P is 
the only way to access music.5  P2P certainly owes much of its 
                                                          
 1. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 3, sc. 2 (George Lyman 
Kittredge, ed., Anthenæum Press 1939). 
 2. Adam Liptak, The Music Industry Reveals Its Carrots and Sticks, N.Y. 
TIMES, September 14, 2003, § 4, at 5. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See http://whatacrappypresent.com (last visited October 17, 2004) 
(humorously warning parents against giving CDs as gifts because kids 
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popularity to its price.  It is free, but other factors also 
contribute to its widespread use.  The selection is unbeatable; 
any music ever released on compact disc (CD) is likely to be 
available on a P2P network.  The most popular songs are 
widely available and, because of their popularity, download in a 
flash. Because each song is downloaded at zero marginal cost to 
the consumer, music fans can try music they would otherwise 
not purchase; if they don’t like it, they can simply delete it.  
The problem is that much of this P2P downloading is illegal.  
Since neither artists nor record companies profit from P2P 
downloads, as downloading becomes a popular alternative to 
purchasing CDs the viability of the music industry’s current 
structure is threatened. 
Licensing under the current regime makes legitimate peer-
to-peer distribution of commercial recordings very difficult.  
Several scholars have proposed alternative compensation 
systems.  This article presents an alternative compensation 
system that, unlike the proposals of Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
William W. Fisher III and Jessica Litman, is technically 
feasible, economically sound, and does not require 
modifications to international agreements to which the United 
States is a party. 
I.  THE CURRENT REGIME 
Any musical recording involves two separate copyrighted 
works: the musical work and the sound recording.  The audio 
heard on a CD is covered by a “sound recording” copyright.6 
The underlying musical composition, which includes elements 
such as melody, lyrics, and harmony that could be written 
down on sheet music is protected by a separate “musical work” 
copyright.7  Because musical recordings are copyrighted, a 
license is required for anyone other than the copyright holder 
to copy and disseminate this type of recording.  The following 
sections outline the steps needed to license a number of common 
methods of dissemination, taking as an example the song “Baby One 
More Time” on Britney Spears’ debut album. 
                                                                                                                            
routinely download music). 
 6. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2000) (listing sound recordings among 
categories of copyrightable works). 
 7. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2000) (listing musical works among 
categories of copyrightable works). 
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A.  LICENSING FOR CD REPRODUCTION 
Imagine I wish to use my computer to burn a few dozen 
CDs containing Britney Spears’ recording of “Baby One More 
Time” to give to friends and acquaintances.  My computer is not 
a “digital audio recording device” as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 
1001,8 so the noncommercial use exemption of 17 U.S.C. § 1008 
does not apply.9  In addition, the Recordable CDs (CD-Rs) I am 
using are primarily intended to hold non-musical data, so no 
royalty is included in the purchase price of the CD-Rs. Burning 
copies of this song on these discs constitutes copyright 
infringement.10 Thus, I must get a license to use both the sound 
recording and the underlying musical work to lawfully make 
and distribute these CDs to my friends and acquaintances. 
Permission to produce and distribute phonorecords11 of the 
musical work is known as a “mechanical license.”12 Mechanical 
licenses are subject to the compulsory license scheme set forth 
in section 115 of the Copyright Act.13 Licenses for the 
production of phonorecords must be issued at a rate set by 
                                                          
 8. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (2000) (defining digital audio recording device 
as any machine or device with a digital recording function “designed or 
marketed for the primary purpose of . . .  making a digital audio copied 
recording for private use”). 
 9. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000) (prohibiting copyright infringement 
actions based on noncommercial use of digital audio recording devices, but 
including no prohibition for use of a computer). 
 10. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(4)(B)(ii) (2000) (excluding media marketed and 
commonly used “for the purpose of making copies of nonmusical literary 
works” from the definition of “digital audio recording medium”); 17 U.S.C. § 
1003(a) (2000) (mandating royalty payments by manufacturers of digital audio 
recording media); 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000) (prohibiting copyright infringement 
actions based on noncommercial copies made onto digital audio recording 
media, but failing to similarly prohibit copyright infringement actions 
involving noncommercial copies made onto media not classified as digital 
audio recording media). 
 11. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (phonorecord is defined as “any material object 
in which sounds . . . are fixed by any method now known or later developed, 
and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”).  From 
this definition LPs, CDs, cassette tapes, and computer disks containing sound 
recordings are phonorecords. Cf. AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, THE ART OF MUSIC 
LICENSING 56, 307 (Prentice Hall Law & Business, 1992). 
 12. AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, supra note 11, at 45, 310. 
 13. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000)  (“In the case of nondramatic musical works, 
the exclusive rights provided by clauses (1) and (3) of section 106, to make and 
to distribute phonorecords of such works, are subject to compulsory licensing 
under the conditions specified by this section.”); AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, supra 
note 11, at 310-311. 
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statute.14  As of September 2004, the statutory rate was 8.5 
cents per phonorecord or 1.65 cents per minute of playing time 
or fraction thereof, whichever is greater.15 
“Baby One More Time” was composed by Max Martin.16  
Therefore, he was the original holder of the copyright 
underlying the musical work recorded by Spears.17 Rather than 
personally handle requests for compulsory mechanical licenses, 
Martin assigned his copyright to Zomba Enterprises, a music 
publishing company.18 As is common in the music industry, 
Zomba Enterprises, in turn, authorized the Harry Fox Agency 
(HFA) to issue licenses on its behalf.19 Due to this series of 
copyright assignments, if I wish to lawfully distribute CDs 
containing “Baby One More Time,” I must obtain permission to 
do so and pay 8.5 cents per copy to the HFA. 20  The Harry Fox 
Agency will distribute 93.25% of the license fee to Zomba 
Enterprises, 21 and Zomba Enterprises will then likely disperse 
a contractually-specified amount of that percentage to Max 
Martin.  This process allows me to produce and distribute 
copies of the underlying musical work. 
Before I begin burning CDs, I must also secure a license for 
the sound recording of “Baby One More Time.”  Since no 
compulsory license system is in place for sound recordings, I 
must enter into a “master use license” with the copyright owner 
of the sound recording to lawfully copy the recording.22  
Ordinarily, the record company that released the recording 
                                                          
 14. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (2000); AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, supra note 11 at 
311. 
 15. United States Copyright Office, 17 U.S.C. §115 Mechanical License 
Royalty Rates (stating current mechanical license royalty rates), at 
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/m200a.html (last visited October 17, 2004). 
 16. Copyright Registration No. PA-922-764 (registered Oct. 29, 1998). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See http://www.copyright.gov/records/cohd.html (last visited October 
17, 2004) (showing Zomba Music Publishers as the copyright owners on a 
search of assignment V3488 P611). In an assignment recorded at V3488 P611, 
the copyright was assigned to Zomba Music Publishers. 
 19. http://www.harryfox.com/index.jsp (last visited October 17, 2004) 
(“[The Harry Fox Agency] is the foremost mechanical licensing, collections, 
and distribution agency for U.S. music publishers.”); AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, 
supra note 11 at 320. 
 20. United States Copyright Office, supra note 15. 
 21. http://www.harryfox.com/public/hfaInfoCommission.jsp (last visited 
October 18, 2004) (stating that the Harry Fox Agency retains a 6.75% 
commission for its services). 
 22. AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, supra note 11 at 11. 
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owns the copyright.23  To burn copies of Britney Spears’ “Baby 
One More Time,” I would have to negotiate a master use license 
with Zomba Recordings, the parent company of Jive Records, 
the company that released Spears’ debut CD.24  No central 
administrator of master use rights exists, so each licensee must 
negotiate directly with the copyright owner.25  Once I have 
obtained a mechanical license from the Harry Fox Agency to 
lawfully use the musical work and a master use license from 
Zomba Recordings to use the sound recording, I am able to 
lawfully make and distribute CDs to my friends and 
acquaintances. 
B.  PUBLIC PERFORMANCE 
Now imagine that I have acquired a lawful copy of “Baby 
One More Time.”  Let us make the further (counterfactual) 
assumption that I enjoy the song, and want to share it with my 
nightclub’s patrons.  Simply playing the CD without a license 
would be a violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), because I would be 
publicly performing the underlying musical work.26  Note that 
playing the CD in my club does not violate any exclusive right 
in the sound recording.  In general, there is no exclusive right 
to public performance of a sound recording.27  Thus, in the case 
of a public performance of the recording as opposed to CD 
production, I only need to a license from the copyright holder of 
the musical work. 
My task is aided by Performing Rights Organizations 
(PROs).  The PROs act as agents for music publishers by 
collecting performance royalties on their behalf.28  Three PROs 
                                                          
 23. See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, supra note 11 at 10. 
 24. See Copyright Registration No. SR-314-996 (registered Feb. 26, 2001). 
 25. See 6-30 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 30.03 (2004). 
 26. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000) (granting copyright holders the exclusive 
right “in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly”). 
 27. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000) (granting the exclusive right to perform 
sound recordings “by means of a digital audio transmission”).  Playing a CD in 
a club is not a “transmission” because the audio signals are not “received 
beyond the place from which they are sent.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 28. See Broadcast Music, Inc. (stating BMI collects license fess on behalf 
of creators it represents), at http://www.bmi.com/about/backgrounder.asp (last 
visited October 17, 2004); The American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers (stating ASCAP protects members’ rights by licensing and 
distributing royalties), at http://www.ascap.com/about (last visited October 18, 
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operate within the United States: The American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast 
Music, Incorporated (BMI), and the Society of European Stage 
Authors and Composers (SESAC).29  These organizations grant 
blanket licenses to establishments of public accommodation, 
such as bars and nightclubs that play music for their patrons.30  
The performance rights for “Baby One More Time” are 
administered by ASCAP.31  To play this song from a CD in my 
club, I may enter into a blanket license for the use of any 
ASCAP-licensed music.  If after negotiating with ASCAP, I 
believe the PRO is offering an unreasonable license rate, I may 
initiate a “rate court” proceeding.32  During this proceeding, a 
judge fixes a reasonable rate for the license I seek to obtain.  
Under a consent decree known as the Amended Final 
Judgment of March 14, 1950, ASCAP may not deny licenses to 
any establishment willing to pay a judicially-fixed license 
rate.33  Once I have obtained a public performance license from 
ASCAP in accordance with this procedure, I may legally play 
Spears’ CD in my establishment ad nauseam (which shouldn’t 
take very long). 
C.  WEBCASTING 
Imagine, further, that merely playing “Baby One More 
Time” in my nightclub does not satisfy my urge to share 
Spears’ unique joie de vivre.  I decide I must disseminate the 
song via the Internet.  To acquire performance rights to the 
musical work, I must enter into a license with ASCAP as 
described above.  As for the sound recording, “Baby One More 
Time,” the Copyright Act grants the owner of a sound recording 
                                                                                                                            
2004).  
 29. AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, supra note 11 at 625-27. 
 30. See American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, ASCAP 
Licenses A-Z (listing a diverse range of available ASCAP license types, from 
Nightclubs to “Jai-Alai Frontons” to “Halls of Fame, Wax Museums, and 
similar”), at http://www.ascap.com/licensing/types.html (last visited October 
17, 2004).  
 31. ASCAP ACE Search for “Baby One More Time” (returning licensing 
data for “Baby One More Time” by Karl Sandberg Martin, the legal name of 
songwriter Max Martin, including a performance by Britney Spears), at 
http://www.ascap.com/ace/search.cfm?mode=search (last visited October 17, 
2004). 
 32. See Simon H. Rifkind, Music Copyrights and Antitrust: A Turbulent 
Courtship, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 9-11 (1985) (describing the 
antitrust consent decree creating the ASCAP “rate court” procedure). 
 33. See id. at 9. 
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copyright the exclusive right “to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”34  In 
addition to this provision, Congress amended the Copyright Act 
in 1998 to include a compulsory license scheme for 
webcasting.35  A webcast is a digital audio transmission.  
Therefore, I must license the sound recording, in addition to 
the underlying musical work, in order to lawfully webcast the 
song. 
The 1998 compulsory license scheme only applies to 
noninteractive webcasts.36  The amendment was designed to 
guarantee that listeners do not receive advance notice of the 
specific music scheduled to be transmitted,37 thus preventing 
webcasts from becoming substitutes for CD purchases.  Rates 
and terms for webcast licenses are set by statute.38  The rates 
and terms appropriate to a specific situation depend on the 
nature and scope of the webcasting activity.39  In response to 
this regulatory scheme, the RIAA created SoundExchange, a 
collective rights organization, to administer webcasting 
licenses.40  Small noncommercial webcasters with revenues 
below $50,000 can webcast unlimited sound recordings for 
$2,000 a year.41 
What if I want to make copies available on a P2P network? 
Currently, no compulsory license statute for P2P applications 
exits.  The remainder of this article discusses recent proposals 
for such a system. 
II.  COMPULSORY LICENSING PROPOSALS FOR P2P 
                                                          
 34. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000). 
 35. 17 U.S.C. § 114(2) (2000). 
 36. 17 U.S.C. § 114(2)(A)(i) (2000). 
 37. 17 U.S.C. 114(2)(C)(ii) (prohibiting the publication of playlists before 
transmission). 
 38. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1)(A) (2000) (creating licenses for five 
categories of webcasters: nonsubscription services, preexisting subscription 
services, new subscription services, preexisting satellite digital audio radio 
services, and  business establishment services). 
 39. See id (stating terms and rates shall distinguish among currently 
available forms of digital audio transmissions). 
 40. Record Industry Association of America (“SoundExchange licenses, 
collects and distributes public performance revenue for sound recording 
copyright holders within such digital channels as cable, satellite and webcast 
transmissions.”), at http://www.riaa.com/about/collective/default.asp (last 
visited October 18, 2004).  
 41. See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement 
Act of 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 78,510, 78,512 (Dec. 24, 2002) (listing minimum fee 
amounts for small webcasters). 
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APPLICATIONS 
Several respected copyright scholars have proposed 
systems of compulsory blanket licensing of copyrighted content 
for Internet use.  These proposals share core goals.  Professor 
Neil Weinstock Netanel proposes a “Noncommerical Use Levy” 
on P2P-related products and services.42  Professor William W. 
Fisher III proposes a similar, yet more radical, levy system that 
would allow greater commercial use within the blanket 
licensing scheme.43  Professor Jessica Litman proposes 
modifications to the Netanel and Fisher proposals.44  Within 
these proposals, a alternative methods of raising money, 
measuring usage, and distributing money have been advanced.  
Each method has significant problems that stem from the 
system’s displacement of private ordering. 
A.  COMMON GOALS 
The Netanel, Fisher, and Litman proposals share two goals 
in reforming the copyright system: semiotic democracy and 
increased efficiency. 
1.  Semiotic Democracy 
Each scholar expresses a desire for a greater variance of 
expression.  Under the current regime, creators who build on 
existing copyrighted works must get permission from the 
copyright holder.45  Because the copyrighted works that form 
the bulk of our received culture are in the hands of a small 
number of large corporations, these professors argue that a 
semiotic oligarchy exits.46  A small number of powerful players 
control the creation of meaning in our culture through their 
stranglehold on copyrighted content.47  This is essentially a 
question of equality; the choice of a default term diminishes the 
ability of all citizens to participate equally in cultural 
development. 
                                                          
 42. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow 
Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2003). 
 43. WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND 
THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 202-3 (2004). 
 44. Jessica D. Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. (forthcoming 2004), available at 
http://www.law.wayne.edu/litman/papers/sharing&stealing.pdf. 
 45. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000) (granting the exclusive right “to prepare 
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work”). 
 46. See e.g., FISHER, supra note 43 at 201. 
 47. See e.g., Netanel, supra note 42 at 7-9. 
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The postmodern movement has seen the rise of pastiche 
and bricolage as popular artistic forms.  In pastiche, the artist 
layers preexisting works and styles to create a new work which 
plays on the tensions between the combined elements of the 
preexisting works.48  In bricolage, the artist uses a variety of 
cultural tools immediately at hand to create works of art.49  
Against this cultural backdrop, Fisher proposes a goal of 
“semiotic democracy,” distributing the power to make cultural 
meaning over a larger range of speakers, destroying the 
oligarchic power of media companies.50  As Fisher defines it, 
“[i]n an attractive society, all persons would be able to 
participate in the process of making cultural meaning.  Instead 
of being merely passive consumers of images and artifacts 
produced by others, they would help shape the world of ideas 
and symbols in which they live.”51 
In copyright terms, postmodern creation is the preparation 
of a series of derivative works.52  For example, “mash-ups” 
constitute a genre of popular music.  In a mash-up, the vocal 
track of a popular song is mixed with the instrumental tracks 
of a different popular song.53  The resulting work infringes 
several copyrights.54  However, due to the relative ease of 
creating mash-ups and the wide availability of the tools needed 
to create them, vast numbers of bootleg mash-ups appear on 
                                                          
 48. Cf. FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF 
LATE CAPITALISM 16-19 (Post-Contemporary Interventions, Stanley Fish & 
Frederic Jameson series eds., 1991) (defining and analyzing the concept of 
postmodern pastiche). 
 49. See CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 19 (Julian Pitt-Rivers 
& Ernest Gellner eds., George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd. trans., 1966) 
(defining and analyzing postmodern bricolage). 
 50. JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 236-37 (1987) (defining the term 
“semiotic democracy” as “delegation of production of meanings and pleasures 
to . . . viewers”). 
 51. William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN 
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 193 (Stephen R. 
Munzer ed., 2001). 
 52. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon 
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work 
may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”). 
 53. Pete Rojas, Bootleg Culture, Salon.com (tracing the development and 
cultural ramifications of mash-ups), at 
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/08/01/bootlegs/ (Aug. 1, 2002). 
 54. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000) (granting copyright holders the exclusive 
right “to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work”). 
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Internet sites and file-sharing networks.55  The ease with 
which new forms of derivative works are able to be created in 
the digital age, could plunge copyright holders into a worldwide 
game of “Whack-A-Mole.”  Allowing these derivative works to 
be produced and disseminated will further semiotic democracy, 
because control of the meaning of the works is seized from 
media companies and placed in the hands of media consumers. 
2.  Increased Efficiency 
The current music distribution system is rife with 
transaction costs and other unnecessary burdens on the 
consumer purchase of music.56  This is, in essence, an 
argument about utility; the choice of a default term affects the 
efficiency of the music distribution system.  The most obvious 
of these – and the easiest to eliminate – is the manufacturing 
and retailing of physical media.  Compulsory licensing has no 
advantage over other paradigms for digital distribution (such 
as à la carte downloads) in this respect, however, since they, 
too, eliminate the cost of manufacturing and distributing 
physical media. 
Compulsory licensing does, however, have an advantage 
over other market mechanisms in that it is unusually seamless 
and fast-responding.  The money allocated for promotion of 
music, which currently makes up the bulk of the cost of a CD, 
could be more efficiently allocated if market signals came 
directly from consumers rather than through intermediaries 
like radio station-based research and CD sales figures.  By 
improving the information available, we decrease music 
producers’ uncertainty, which leads to a more efficient 
allocation of resources.  For this to happen, funds must be 
distributed in proportion to consumer demand for the music. 
B.  THE PROPOSALS 
Three similar proposals for alternative compensation 
systems have been advanced.  First, Professor Fisher proposes 
a system of compulsory licensing with funds collected through 
levies and distributed to copyright holders based on popularity.  
Second, Professor Netanel proposes a similar system which 
differs in a number of minor respects.  Finally, Professor 
Litman adds opt-out provisions to the Fisher and Netanel 
                                                          
 55. Rojas, supra note 53. 
 56. See FISHER, supra note 43. 
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proposals and distributes funds to authors, not copyright 
holders. 
1.  Fisher’s Proposal 
Fisher proposes a system of compulsory licensing for both 
commercial and noncommercial verbatim and derivative 
reproduction of music and movies.57  Works would first be 
registered with the Copyright Office.  A levy would be placed on 
products used to consume media.58  Usage would be measured 
through reporting, sampling, and surveys.  Funds would be 
distributed in proportion to the popularity of the work.59 
a.  Registration 
Under Fisher’s system, a copyright holder who wanted to 
be paid when his work was used by others would submit the 
work to the Copyright Office, which would issue a globally 
unique identifier for the work.60  Only music and audiovisual 
works would be eligible for compulsory licensing.61  Any failure 
to register would cause the work to fall into the public 
domain.62  Once the system was in place, we would eliminate 
“most of the current prohibitions on the unauthorized 
reproduction, distribution, adaptation, and performance of 
audio and video recordings” over the Internet.63 
Of course, disputes would arise over registrations.  Fisher 
proposes to leave in place current rules about joint ownership 
of copyrights and the contractual relations between the owners 
                                                          
 57. See FISHER, supra note 43, at 202-4. 
 58. See id. at 216-17. 
 59. See id. at 223-34. 
 60. See id. at 203. 
 61. See id.  Fisher offers no justification for this limitation; one assumes 
that he so limits his proposal because he thinks only music and movies will be 
traded over P2P networks. Certainly, the choice makes sense because the 
structure of the music and movie industries lends itself to blanket licensing 
much better than, for instance, the book publishing or software industries, 
because while the vast majority of CDs and DVDs are priced between $10 and 
$30, common book prices range from $1 to $75. Software prices vary even 
more wildly. Setting a single price for those industries does seem less 
palatable than for music and movies. 
 62. See id. at 5. This is the first of Fisher’s many proposals that would 
violate United States’ treaty obligations. He recognizes these violations, and 
suggests that the treaties will need to be modified before his system can be 
implemented.   
 63. FISHER, supra note 43, at 202. 
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of various copyrights in a single work.64  Each registration 
would be subject to a trademark-like “opposition” procedure.65  
If the work in question included portions of other works, the 
registrant would be required to estimate what percentage of 
the work to be registered is taken from existing works and to 
give the registration numbers of the works it excerpts.66 
b.  Collection 
Fisher proposes a tax on the goods and services used to 
gain access to music and film as one method designed to 
generate the money needed to compensate copyright holders for 
revenues lost due to legalized P2P sharing.67  This tax would 
apply to equipment used to make digital copies, media used to 
store copies, and Internet access service.68  Modest taxes on all 
of these goods, while overinclusive,69 would generate enough 
money to compensate creators.70 
c.  Measurement 
In order to distribute funds fairly, a rough estimate of the 
relative popularity of works will be needed.  Parties who 
stream songs to users would be required to report what works, 
referenced by registration number, were played back at what 
times.71  Some loose survey evidence would be used to 
determine rates of CD burning and how often those burned 
                                                          
 64. See id. at 204. 
 65. Id. at 205. The wisdom of this procedural proposal is dubious. 
Trademark holders must expend significant resources “policing” their marks, 
preventing third parties from appropriating them to keep from losing their 
rights. Copyright holders have no such obligation. While equitable defenses to 
an infringement action may eventually arise, in general copyright holders 
retain their exclusive rights without any affirmative action. It would be 
extremely costly and inefficient to force copyright holders to search all new 
registrations to make sure none were fraudulent re-registrations of their 
works. 
 66. See id. at 205-6. 
 67. See id. at 217. 
 68. See id. 
 69. There is no way to tell, for instance, which CD-Rs that are sold will be 
used for the storage of copyrighted music and which will be used for the 
storage of data or public domain works. Thus, all CD-Rs must be taxed, and 
some uses of technology unrelated to music and movies will become more 
costly. 
 70. See id. at 217-22 (estimating the revenue from such taxes based on 
retail sales figures). 
 71. See id. at 224-25. 
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CDs get played.72  File-sharing services would also be required 
to report all downloads of files bearing a registration number to 
the Copyright Office.73  The number of times those downloaded 
files are actually played would be determined by a system of 
randomly-sampled usage measurement similar to the current 
system of television ratings.74 
Fisher is rightly concerned that unscrupulous parties will 
attempt to “game” the system, attempting to make the 
aggregate data reflect something other than the true popularity 
of the works.  For example, imagine that I have written a very 
bad song, which has received a registration number upon 
submission to the copyright office.  Nobody really wants to 
listen to my song; if the system operated perfectly, I would get 
no money from the compulsory licensing authority.  But I want 
money, so I game the system.  I modify my file sharing software 
so that in every download report, it claims I have downloaded 
my song many thousands of times.  I stream my song from one 
computer of mine to the other all day and all night, reporting 
each stream to the Copyright Office.  Not satisfied with these 
numbers, I write a computer virus that causes each infected 
machine to report thousands of downloads of my song and to 
stream my song continuously.  Quickly, my song seems to be 
very popular, and I get a healthy slice of the money allocated to 
compensate creators.75 
Of course, appropriate regulations can make it illegal to do 
all of these things, and the system would do its best to filter out 
obviously bogus data.  But the example above reveals a thorny 
                                                          
 72. See id. at 225. 
 73. See id. This solution probably outlaws open-source file sharing 
programs (since the numbers they report could be modified by a user) and all 
file sharing systems that do not use a central server. For example, on the 
Gnutella network, there exists no single point through which all search 
requests go and to which all downloads are reported. Mandating network 
architecture in this way seems likely to stifle innovation. 
 74. See id. at 226-28.  Fisher makes a convincing argument that people 
might be willing to have their consumption watched as long as their privacy 
was protected.  But among some of the segments of the population that 
currently make the most use of P2P networks, a significant percentage of the 
downloaded files consist of pornography.  Presumably, these particular P2P 
consumers would be less willing to have their consumption monitored. 
 75. Eugene Volokh has noted that special interest groups like the NRA 
might use similar, more distributed methods to “game” alternative 
compensation systems in order to express audience preferences having 
nothing to do with music. See Eugene Volokh, Download Tax, at 
http://volokh.com/2003_09_07_volokh_archive.html#106314198323180349 
(last visited October 18, 2004). 
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contradiction.  The most accurate and efficient ways to 
measure the popularity of digital content violate two of the 
values that have led to the wide adoption, success, and stability 
of the Internet.  The easiest, most accurate way to measure 
downloads and streams is to monitor all bits on a segment of 
the network and record how often certain works are 
downloaded or streamed.  However, this violates the “end-to-
end principle,” or “e2e.”  The end-to-end principle holds that the 
Internet should be as simple as possible, functioning simply to 
route data between points on the network.  The network works 
best if it does not inspect data or provide any functionality 
itself, but simply moves packets around.76  Computer science 
specialists have made convincing arguments that placing high-
level functions in the network decreases utility and increases 
the cost of the network.77  Including measurement 
infrastructure in the network, rather than at the ends, could 
have severe consequences for innovation. 
However, putting the measurement structure in the ends 
of the network has its own problems.  If the measurement 
infrastructure is placed in the ends, then users must trust the 
ends to return authentic usage data, as Fisher assumes we 
do.78  Fisher proposes collecting sampling data from trusted 
playback and download devices.79  Although it is easiest to get 
good data from tamper-proof devices, it is difficult to make 
tamper-proof devices that are also open-source.80  Open source 
tools have been the foundation of the Internet, and outlawing 
their use to play back and download digital music files would 
seriously stifle innovation by limiting users to proprietary 
solutions. 
As shown infra in section III-A-4, measurement of P2P 
usage of files need not violate e2e and can be implemented in 
open source software. 
                                                          
 76. For a simple and well-written introduction to the end-to-end 
argument, see Doc Searls and David Weinberger, World of Ends, at 
http://www.worldofends.com/ (Last modified April 28, 2003). 
 77. See, e.g., J.H. Saltzer, D.P. Reed, and D.D. Clark, in End-to-End 
Arguments in System Design, 2:4 ACM TRANSACTIONS IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS 
277 (1984). 
 78. FISHER, supra note 43, at 226-28. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Because the user can modify the program, the user can make the 
program return arbitrary data to the measurement authority. 
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d.  Distribution 
Fisher proposes that funds be distributed by the Copyright 
Office in proportion to the number of times the works were 
consumed with three caveats.  First, longer recordings would 
yield larger payments for creators.81  Fisher defends this choice 
by noting that longer musical works and movies tend to cost 
more to make, and that limited consumer attention spans will 
counteract any incentive to pad the length of artistic works.82  
Second, payments for derivative works would be assessed based 
on the creator’s rough estimation to the Copyright Office 
concerning how much material is original or from preexisting 
works, and compensation would then be distributed 
proportionally to respective holders of the copyright in the 
derivative and original.83  This would allow the creators of the 
preexisting works used in samples, expurgated films, and 
mash-ups to be appropriately compensated.84 
2.  Netanel’s Proposal 
Netanel’s proposal for peer-to-peer file sharing is 
substantially similar to Fisher’s but contains slight 
variations.85  For example, rather than allowing both 
commercial and noncommercial use under compulsory license, 
Netanel allows only noncommercial use.86  Also, whereas 
Fisher’s proposal encompasses only music and movies, 
Netanel’s encompasses all copyrighted content other than 
computer software and unpublished works.87  Finally, Netanel 
proposes licensing the preparation of noncommercial derivative 
works that would retain the original’s identifying information 
and would  compensate only the original creator.88 
3.  Litman’s Proposal 
In her article Sharing and Stealing, Professor Jessica 
                                                          
 81. See FISHER, supra note 43, at 230. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. at 235-6. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Though the proposals are similar, Netanel’s richly-documented paper 
provides a more thorough analysis of numerous issues that Fisher is unable to 
cover in a single chapter in his book. 
 86. See Netanel, supra note 42, at 42. 
 87. See id. at 41. 
 88. See id. at 38-39.  But see FISHER, supra note 43, at 234-6 (describing 
how authors of material underlying multilayered derivative works would be 
compensated under his scheme). 
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Litman proposes a partially voluntary blanket licensing 
system.89  In Litman’s system, all existing music would be 
included in a levy, measurement, and compensation system 
like those proposed by Netanel and Fisher, however Litman’s 
system, would allow authors to opt out and would deliver 
revenue to creators, not copyright holders.90 
a.  Opt-out 
Litman’s proposal allows copyright holders to opt out of the 
blanket license scheme by fulfilling two requirements.  First, 
they must publish their works only in a yet-to-be-specified 
format that includes copyright management information.91  
Any music released only in a new “*.drm format”92 may not be 
reproduced without the copyright holder’s consent, but 
copyright holders who opt out are ineligible to share in the 
compensation pool.93  A copyright holder’s remedies against a 
user who shares the *.drm file without permission would be the 
same as those that exist now.94  Litman argues that because so 
much music would be freely downloadable, consumers would 
respect a copyright holder’s decision to opt out of the free 
distribution system.95  Because of this increased respect for 
proprietary rights, enforcement against infringers of *.drm files 
would be easier and more politically palatable than 
enforcement against infringers is now.96  Under Litman’s 
scheme it would be difficult for works distributed publicly in a 
non-*.drm format, which includes all works published before 
the system is put into place, to be withdrawn from availability 
to the public.97 
                                                          
 89. See Litman, supra note 44.  
 90. See id. at 39-47. 
 91. Id. at 48. Litman uses the definition of “copyright management 
information” in 17 U.S.C. § 1202, which includes title, author, copyright 
owner, etc. The big problem with this aspect of the proposal is technical, not 
legal. People own lots of devices, like CD players, that they want to keep 
using. Any format would have to be backward-compatible with the CD, and no 
backward-compatible system of encoding copyright management information 
exists. 
 92. This is Litman’s proposed name for a new file format or set of file 
formats incorporating digital rights management (“DRM”) technology.  See 
Litman, supra note 44, at 48. 
 93. See Litman, supra note 44, at 43-45. 
 94. See id. at 46. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. at 47. 
 97. See id. at 46. 
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This opt-out provision functions as a penalty default rule.  
A penalty default exists when the law sets a default rule that 
neither party will want, forcing the two parties to reveal 
information to each other and to decide on bargained terms.98  
Since 1976, authors have been allowed to divide their various 
exclusive rights among a number of transferees.99  So, for 
instance, the right to publicly perform a musical work might be 
owned by a different party than the right to reproduce that 
work.  Litman intends the opt-out provision to eliminate some 
of the tangle of rights that has arisen since the elimination of 
the indivisibility rule.100  Because the work will be subject to 
the compulsory license scheme if it is released to the public in 
any form other than *.drm, the owners of the various exclusive 
rights will be forced to bargain with each other to reach 
licensing terms for the distribution of the work.101  Each owner 
of an exclusive right has an equal bargaining position, since 
each has the power to push the entire tangle of rights into the 
compulsory licensing scheme.  Thus, Litman gives each holder 
of an exclusive right a “poison pill.”  Copyright holders are 
unlikely to divide up their rights because bargaining among 
parties who all hold poison pills is extremely costly.  Parties 
who have sold off pieces of the pie are likely to buy them back, 
so that they are certain that no transferee will take the “poison 
pill.”  Litman’s proposal reintroduces a de facto indivisibility 
rule through the introduction of a penalty default rule. 
Thus, placing copyright holders between two socially 
beneficial outcomes has a number of advantages.  It lessens 
some of the loss in economic autonomy that comes with 
compulsory license schemes, since it gives copyright holders at 
least some choice.  It guarantees a socially useful outcome 
(leaving a prospective licensee with either a compulsory license 
or a single party with whom to bargain).  Finally, by requiring 
parties who opt out to register with the Copyright Office, the 
ownership of the copyright is known publicly so that 
prospective licensees know whom to approach.102 
                                                          
 98. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (introducing 
the concept of the penalty default). 
 99. See Litman, supra note 44, at 17-18. 
 100. Id. at 44. 
 101. See id. at 47. 
 102. This registration requirement raises some treaty concerns, since 
registration is a formality banned by the Berne Convention.  See Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 14, 1967, 
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b.  Bypassing Copyright Holders 
The second difference between Litman’s proposal and 
Fisher’s and Netanel’s is her method of distributing the funds 
collected in the compulsory license scheme.  Litman proposes 
paying monies directly to creators, regardless of who owns the 
copyright.103  Because the urge to establish a system of 
compensation for P2P file sharing arises because “our sense of 
fairness impels us to compensate creators because they deserve 
to be paid,” Litman argues that we should simply compensate 
the creators.104  In defending this proposal, Litman asserts that 
it improves on the present allocation of authority to collect 
royalties, which “has systematically disadvantaged 
stakeholders who are small, independent or poorly 
organized.”105 
The legislative decision to give this windfall to the creators 
rather than any subsequent owners of copyrights is analogous, 
under this reasoning, to that made when Congress extended 
the duration of copyright in 1998 and in 1976.  Congress 
decided that the benefit of the added duration should be given 
to creators, not to transferees.  Accordingly, the copyright term 
extensions included provisions for the termination of transfers.  
With appropriate notice, at the end of the original, pre-
extension copyright term, artists could take back their 
rights.106  The practical effect of this provision is that the owner 
of the copyright at the expiration of the original copyright term 
ends up paying the artist some large portion of the value of the 
additional years of copyright protection.107  This is fair because 
                                                                                                                            
art. 5 § 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 223 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (“The enjoyment 
and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality….”). See 
Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2004) (discussing the Berne Convention’s ban on formalities). 
 103. See Litman, supra note 44, at 41-42. 
 104. Id.  Litman makes the right alienable, but separate from ownership of 
the copyrights themselves (which are, in most cases, already owned by the 
record company and music publisher). A new agreement, separate from any 
assignment of copyright, would be needed to designate the record company 
and music publisher as intermediary for P2P royalties. While this is a better 
solution than making the royalty rights entirely inalienable, it still radically 
changes the landscape under which the recording contract was negotiated, 
potentially going against the intent of the parties. 
 105. Id. at 41. 
 106. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2000) (termination provision of the 1998 
Copyright Term Extension Act); 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2000) (termination provision 
of the 1976 Copyright Act). 
 107. In few cases are the artists themselves in a position to adequately 
exploit the work commercially. The assignment of rights to the artist ex ante 
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at the time the artist sold his rights, the price reflected the 
expectation of a certain copyright term; the expiration date of 
the copyright was known to both parties, and they bargained 
based on that information.  Because the artist didn’t own those 
extra twenty years when he sold the copyright, he couldn’t sell 
them.  If the transferee wants them, he should have to buy 
them. 
However, the two situations are not analogous.  Basic to 
the regulatory calculus of Fisher’s and Netanel’s proposals is 
the goal of replacing revenue displaced by peer-to-peer file 
sharing.108  Free P2P downloads are substitute goods for 
purchased CDs – not perfect substitutes, as the RIAA seems to 
claim,109  but substitutes nonetheless.  While recording 
contracts did not contemplate revenues from a system of 
compulsory licensing of P2P downloads, they did contemplate 
revenues from CD sales.  The Fisher and Netanel proposals are 
designed to replace lost CD revenues, not to give record 
companies a windfall.  There is no economic or legal 
justification for a bare wealth transfer from the record 
companies to the artists. 
There is, however, some justification.  Litman feels that 
artists have been given a raw deal.  Her “proposal is motivated 
in part by [her] conviction that composers and musicians have 
been ill-served by the current system.”110  The record 
companies unfairly exploited the economically weak musicians, 
strong-arming them into signing contracts they didn’t 
understand and paying them a pittance for songs that made 
the record companies millions.111  Musicians “[complain] so 
                                                                                                                            
simply gives her bargaining power in negotiations and forces the parties to 
reach an agreement. See Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 
275-76 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (arguing that the assignment of rights by 
an outside authority allows an efficient price to be set by the parties without 
further intervention). Because neither the artists nor other third parties are 
likely to be the highest users of the copyright due to sunk costs on the part of 
the transferee, this provision is likely to result in a more favorable royalty 
arrangement for the artist. 
 108. See FISHER, supra note 43, at 242 (“the proposed regime would help 
[copyright holders] by replacing the revenues they lose to Internet activities 
with money transmitted through the Copyright Office.”); Netanel, supra note 
42, at 46 (stating that his proposal seeks to “replace that fraction of copyright 
industry revenues supplanted by NUL-privileged file sharing”). 
 109. The RIAA claims that the industry loses $4.2 billion per year.  
Recording Industry Association of America (last visited October 17, 2004), at 
http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp. 
 110. Litman, supra note 44, at 43. 
 111. See Future of Music Coalition, Major Label Contract Clause Critique, 
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bitterly of their treatment at the hands of the record 
companies,” but put out records nonetheless; we should give 
them a slice of the pie.112 
Litman, then, wants to rewrite recording contracts ex post 
because she does not think they were fair.  Her proposal would 
operate as a particularly broad unconscionability statute, 
partially vitiating all extant transfers of copyright.  Like all 
wealth transfers, it is not really efficient or inefficient; rather, 
it is morally defensible or indefensible.  In this case, it is not 
defensible.  While many musicians have been given a raw deal, 
taking away their freedom of contract is not the answer. 
In some instances, this would clearly work injustice.  
Assume, counterfactually, that I am a talented, hip indie 
rocker.  I write and record a song and sell the rights to a small 
independent label run out of a friend’s basement apartment.  
The indie label sells CDs and sends me some of the proceeds, 
spending significant amounts to promote me in all sorts of 
perfectly laudable, non-payola ways – sending review copies of 
my CD to music writers, printing up posters, having suitably 
ironic post-glamorous photos of me taken.  Then, Litman’s 
compulsory license system is implemented.  Sales of my CD 
plummet as fans download the music on P2P networks, with 
the absolute certainty that what they are doing is both legal 
and just.  I get a bunch of money I would not otherwise have 
received; my friend’s label goes under because CD sales slump.  
I record my next CD and release it on P2P networks.  But 
nobody downloads it, because nobody knows it’s there.  Music 
writers do not review it.  I scramble to put promotional 
infrastructure in place myself, but I fail.  I just write the music; 
it is the label’s job to promote it.  My work fails in the 
marketplace for lack of promotion.  Now, though I received a 
windfall from the sharing of my first album, the infrastructure 
through which my work is promoted and edited has been 
                                                                                                                            
(Oct. 3, 2001) (analyzing common clauses in major label recording contracts 
and their inequitable effects on musicians), at 
http://www.futureofmusic.org/contractcrit.cfm.  See also Tim Quirk, Welcome 
to the Wall of Shame (June 6, 2001) (describing mistreatment at the hands of a 
major label), at http://www.futureofmusic.org/articles/shameintro.cfm (last 
visited October 17, 2004).  
 112. See Litman, supra note 44, at 29 n.115 (“Whether musicians will make 
music if the copyright regime is altered is an empirical question, but the fact 
that so many musicians have complained so bitterly at their treatment at the 
hands of record companies without withholding their music suggests that 
musicians’ motivations are more complex than the simple copyright-incentive 
model captures.”). 
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destroyed.  My friend and I are both out of a job, and we cannot 
even go back to our old jobs as record store clerks. 
While it may not end up being as dire as all that, there is 
no good reason to hand a pile of money to artists and force 
them to take responsibility for their own careers.  It may not be 
what they want.  If they want to promote themselves, they 
may; all they have to do is hold on to their copyrights.  We 
should allow musicians to make that choice. 
III.  AN ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION PROPOSAL 
A.  MECHANICS OF THE PROPOSAL 
1.  Goals 
The compensation schemes proposed by Fisher and 
Netanel focus on compensating copyright holders for lost 
revenues due to CD sales.  The systems are designed to 
simulate a world without P2P copying.  But we no longer live in 
a world without widespread P2P copying, and it is simply not 
possible to put that particular cat back in that particular bag.  
If we are to give copyright holders the choice to opt out, they do 
not opt out into a world of perfect control over their copyrighted 
works.  They opt out instead into a world in which 
uncompensated copying is socially accepted and routine in all 
segments of society, in which lawsuits against hundreds of 
consumers have failed to make an appreciable dent in file 
sharing activity, and in which Digital Rights Management 
technologies are cracked routinely.  Our system does not need 
to make the record companies whole; all it must do is provide 
an environment more attractive than the one that exists today.  
Given the dire straits in which the record industry has lately 
found itself, this should not be too difficult.  There is room for a 
scheme that improves on the status quo without reaching the 
status quo ante bellum. 
2.  Scope 
The compulsory license will be limited to musical works.  
Only noncommercial use will be privileged; however, the 
commercial distribution of copies for noncommercial use will be 
allowed.  The services of these “download service providers” 
will be heavily levied, and profits will be small because such 
services will have to compete with legal downloads from peers; 
the presence of a free alternative will tend to depress prices 
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and provide incentives for value-added services, like 
organization of music, information about artists, community 
features, and other popular services.113  This will also allow 
artists, record companies, and their affiliates to distribute the 
music they produce directly to consumers, though, as described 
below, only peer-to-peer shares will be measured for purposes 
of compensation. 
Noncommercial derivative works will be allowed.  To the 
extent that they are substantially similar to the original, they 
will have the same or a similar audio fingerprint as the 
original, and will be counted in the popularity of the original.114  
To the extent that it is not substantially similar, the use of the 
original will not be counted for purposes of compensation.115  If 
a musician wishes to create a derivative for commercial use, 
she will have to negotiate with the copyright holders, as she 
would now.  Commercial derivatives would be counted just like 
originals, and private contracts between the creator of the 
derivative and the copyright holder in the original would 
govern what portion of the derivative author’s revenues from 
the levy system would be passed on to the copyright holder in 
the original. 
3.  Participation 
As in Litman’s proposal, copyright holders may opt out of 
the system.  If they do, they will have the same rights they do 
                                                          
 113. This means that services like iTunes Music Store and Rhapsody will 
likely survive the transition to compulsory licensing. Both their costs and 
their revenues are likely to decrease, however. They’ll no longer need to pay 
the record companies and music publishers, but they will no longer be the only 
legal way to download music. 
 114. An audio fingerprint is a unique identifier of the audio content of a 
song. It does not change when the audio is converted from one file format to 
another. Since the audio fingerprint is shorter than the audio file itself, there 
necessarily exists more than one audio file that generates a given audio 
fingerprint. However, the chances of such a collision are so small that it is 
unlikely that one will occur in many hundreds of years. Rob Kaye, founder of 
MusicBrainz, a community-based music metadata project that relies on audio 
fingerprinting technology, has pointed out that the present state of audio 
fingerprinting technology is unlikely to provide the reliability needed for the 
proposed system. While this is true now, the political obstacles preventing the 
implementation of an alternative compensation system seem likely to allow 
time for technology to catch up. 
 115. This is more for the sake of simplicity than anything else.  Fisher’s 
proposal that the creator of a derivative work guess at the percentage of the 
work made up of other preexisting works is unsatisfying; absent any empirical 
way to measure such derivatives, limiting the scope to noncommercial use and 
compensating only substantially similar derivatives seems the best choice. 
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today.116  If copyright holders choose to opt in, they must 
register and deposit a copy of the work with the Copyright 
Office.117  This registration will be separate from all subsisting 
copyrights, and the registration will not be valid until it is 
approved by all owners of copyright in the underlying works, 
such as musical works, scripts, and sampled works.  All 
underlying copyrights must be registered and deposited before 
the compulsory license scheme registration will issue.118  Like 
Litman’s penalty default rule, this requirement forces the 
owners of the underlying copyrights to bargain, because no 
compulsory license revenue accrues until a valid registration 
issues.119  To encourage copyright holders to opt in instead of 
expending resources on Digital Rights Management technology, 
section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act will be 
modified to minimally comply with the terms of Article 11 of 
the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright 
Treaty.120 
                                                          
 116. Alternately, we could say that copyright holders who opt out have 
some lower level of copyright protection, still within treaty obligations, 
assuming the arguable proposition that such a level of protection exists. 
 117. The “work” here means the sound recording or audiovisual work that 
is the final product of the production process. 
 118. This has the added side benefit of creating a record of the ownership 
of all underlying copyrights and causing copies to be deposited with the 
Library of Congress, so that the public will know when the works fall into the 
public domain, and will be able to access a copy of the works when they do. For 
a discussion of the importance of such formalities to an efficient copyright 
system, see generally Sprigman, supra note 102. 
 119. Unlike Litman’s penalty default rule, this solution does not violate 
any treaty obligations and does not require the creation of a backward-
compatible, watermarked audio format that all parties must use. 
 120. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000) (“No person shall circumvent a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected 
under this title.”).  Article 11 of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty requires 
signatories to prohibit circumvention of technological measures “that restrict 
acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors 
concerned or permitted by law.” WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 
I.L.M. 65 (1997), available at 
http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/94dc.htm (last visited October 17, 
2004). Section 1201 will be modified to allow the production, distribution, and 
traffic in circumvention devices, and it will allow circumvention for any 
purpose not currently prohibited by the Copyright Act, including fair use, 
reproduction of public domain works, reverse engineering, and so on. Because 
traffic in circumvention devices will be legal, digital rights management 
schemes would not work very well and would be abandoned in favor of 
registration for compulsory license royalties. Courts have begun to read the 
current language of Section 1201 in this way, focusing on the limitations the 
Copyright Act places on exclusive rights. See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. 
Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. 
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At first, this does not seem like much of a penalty default 
rule.  After all, if the parties refuse to bargain and/or fail to 
register, they all retain exclusive, proprietary rights 
enforceable against the world.  But how enforceable are those 
rights, really, against noncommercial home use?  Home use is 
difficult to detect and deter.  Once a compulsory license scheme 
is in place, P2P networks will become legitimate avenues for 
the distribution of all sorts of content.  No longer will copyright 
holders be able to argue that the majority of content swapped 
on P2P networks is infringing.  There will be at least a 
“substantial noninfringing use” for any software or device used 
to store, copy, share, or play back audio or video.121  Lawsuits 
against operators of second-generation P2P networks have 
failed so far, and they are likely to continue to fail.122  By 
shifting the context in which P2P networks operate from one of 
presumptive infringement to presumptive noninfringement, we 
make it much more difficult for copyright holders to stop 
unauthorized sharing.  While copyright holders are nominally 
offered a choice, the most profitable option should be 
participation in the compulsory licensing regime. 
So why not just say what we are doing?  Why not throw 
open the gates and refuse to allow copyright holders to opt out?  
First, allowing this nominal choice keeps us from violating 
treaty obligations.  Second, the appearance of a choice will 
make the implementation of compulsory licensing more 
politically feasible.  Finally, this system allows the owners of 
underlying copyrights in the work the opportunity to privately 
bargain and agree on how to split up the money they receive.  
This system of private ordering will set prices more accurately 
than a government-mandated system of splitting up proceeds 
among copyright owners. 
4.  Collection 
A levy will be placed on products used to consume digital 
                                                                                                                            
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 121. See Sony Corp v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) 
(establishing that devices “suitable for substantial noninfringing use” do not 
give rise to contributory copyright infringement liability). 
 122. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 
1154 (9th Cir. 2004), (holding that vendors of P2P software are not 
contributorily or vicariously liable for users’ acts of copyright infringement). 
But cf. In Re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(Posner, J.) (upholding grant of preliminary injunction to plaintiff copyright 
holders against continued distribution of Aimster, a P2P application). 
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media.123  Fisher and Netanel have performed good analyses of 
the types of goods that should be levied and what levy amounts 
would produce the necessary revenues. 
5.  Measurement 
The sole measure of the popularity of a work will be the 
number of peers making it available for download.  This has a 
number of advantages.  First, it fairly accurately reflects 
whether the user listens to the song or watches the movie; disk 
space being scarce, unwanted media are likely to be deleted.  
Because users will have no incentive to disable the sharing 
function of their P2P software once file swapping is legal, the 
musical tastes of the vast majority of P2P users will be 
reflected.  By refusing to share, all they accomplish is denying 
compensation to their favorite musical artists; they do not pay 
any less, but they lose the power to control where part of their 
money goes.  Second, it is by its nature public and verifiable.  
P2P networks function by accurately returning a list of the 
hosts on which a particular file can be found; this method 
exploits that feature.124  In fact, a version of this popularity 
measurement method is already being used by a private 
company to generate data on the popularity of MP3 files on 
behalf of major record companies.125  Third, it is easy to 
implement in existing systems, since all P2P networks natively 
include the required functionality. 
Finally, it can be implemented while allowing the use of 
                                                          
 123. Optionally, consumers and businesses could be able to receive a 
refund of the levy amount from the manufacturer by submitting a form 
including proof of purchase and a statement, under penalty of perjury, that 
the products will not be used to consume digital media covered by the 
compulsory license scheme. The problem with this is that everyone is likely to 
always claim that their products will not be used to consume digital media, 
since it’s effectively impossible to check. 
 124. In the face of recent RIAA lawsuits, some P2P software packages have 
begun to allow users to keep the lists of files shared private, responding only 
to requests for specific files and not to requests for lists of entire collections. 
This would not prove a problem for two reasons. First, the incentive for such 
behavior would go away once the regime was implemented, since the RIAA 
lawsuits would end. Second, the absence of these users from the sample will 
not affect its accuracy significantly.  If sharers choose to hide their lists, they 
just lose their opportunity to make sure their favorite artists are appropriately 
compensated. 
 125. See Jeff Howe, BigChampagne Is Watching You, WIRED 11:10, 
available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.10/fileshare.html (October 
2003) (last visited October 17, 2004) (describing P2P metrics company 
BigChampagne and its relationship with major record labels). 
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open-source software and without violating e2e.  When the 
copyright holder registers the work, she includes a deposit copy 
of the work in digital form.  The copyright office, using a 
publicly-available, royalty-free audio fingerprinting 
algorithm,126 generates and posts the audio fingerprint of the 
song.127  The measurement authority runs a number of 
computers that crawl P2P networks, querying randomly-
selected hosts for a list of the audio fingerprints of the files 
they’re sharing.  The hosts cannot send audio fingerprints of 
files they are not in fact sharing, since the measurement 
servers periodically download randomly-selected files as a spot-
check mechanism, and it is impossible to derive a 
corresponding audio file from an audio fingerprint.  There will 
be criminal penalties for causing a host to falsify its reports; 
violators will be caught through these spot-checks. 
If the audio fingerprint of a downloadable file matches that 
one file with the copyright office, the work will be credited with 
one “availability.”  If it does not match, no credit will be 
given.128  This will encourage copyright holders to make 
‘official’ versions of their works widely available on P2P 
networks, to make it even more likely that each host sharing 
the file results in an “availability.”  P2P servers run by 
copyright holders or their affiliates will be required to identify 
themselves to the measurement crawler; failure to do so will 
result in stiff penalties, including contributory and vicarious 
liability.129 
This way, the measurement authority receives an accurate 
picture of the popularity of each file without placing 
measurement in the network itself, without trusting each 
individual host to report information that is not immediately 
verifiable, and without supplanting existing P2P protocols. 
6.  Distribution 
The market has already decided the relative value of works 
by their popularity.  The regulatory system should not alter 
                                                          
 126. Obviously, no such publicly-available, royalty-free audio 
fingerprinting algorithm has yet been released, but one could be developed or 
licensed during the implementation of the system. 
 127. See supra note 114. 
 128. There will be a temptation to use data about files that do not 
correspond to registered works as fodder for infringement investigations. 
 129. The only other way to game the system would be to write a virus or 
worm that caused infected machines to share the file in question.  If done with 
knowledge of the registrant, the registrant would be vicariously liable. 
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these results.  However, if registrants were simply paid a set 
amount per availability, people with large music collections 
would have more influence on the distribution of funds than 
people with small music collections.  Because there are only so 
many hours in a day, we can assume that a person with a small 
music collection listens to each song more often than a person 
with a large music collection.130  For this reason, the ability of 
each host to influence the distribution of the pool should be the 
same regardless of the number of files it makes available.131  
Stated differently, each host gets the same number of “votes,” 
and those votes are divided up equally among all works in that 
host’s collection.132 
For work x, the overall share of the pool (Sx) is: 
 
n
n
x
x
x
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F
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=  
 
where n is the total number of works in the sample, A 
measures the number of hosts on which the work is available, F 
measures the total number of works shared by the hosts 
sharing the work, and S is the percentage of the total pool to be 
distributed to the registrant of x.  To determine the amount 
paid to each registrant, we simply multiply by the total pool of 
money to be distributed, so 
 
                                                          
 130. This assumption is not perfect; music fans with large collections seem 
likely to spend more hours per day listening to music than people for whom 
the lower relative importance of music is reflected by their small music 
collections. 
 131. This makes the system slightly easier to game, since it rewards a 
cheater who sets up a farm of hosts which each share only one song.  However, 
a registrant who did so would be criminally liable. 
 132. This is, in some ways, a modification of the “voting” system proposed 
in the Blur/Banff Proposal. See Jamie Love, Artists Want to be Paid: The 
Blur/Banff Proposal, at 
http://www.nsu.newschool.edu/blur/blur02/user_love.html (Mar. 25, 2003) (last 
visited October 17, 2004).  However, my proposal does not require any action 
on the part of the user and does not allow the expression of extra-artistic 
preferences. 
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where T is the total pool of money to be distributed and P 
is the payment to the registrant of x. 
So, for example, imagine three users, Arthur, Boris, and 
Carrie.  A has 3 songs in his collection.  B has 2 songs in his 
collection.  C has 5 songs in her collection.  A and C are both 
sharing “Baby One More Time.”  B is sharing “Saint Simon” by 
The Shins.  A, B, and C are all sharing “Say Yes” by Elliott 
Smith.  A is sharing “Come Home, Baby Julie” by The 
American Analog Set.  C is sharing “The District Sleeps 
Tonight” by The Postal Service, “Fox in the Snow” by Belle and 
Sebastian, and “Allison” by Elvis Costello.  Thus, Britney 
receives 12.8% of the pool, The Shins receive 25.6%, Elliott 
Smith receives 15.4%, The American Analog Set receives 
15.4%, and The Postal Service, Belle and Sebastian, and Elvis 
Costello each receive 10.3%.133 
Thus, this method of measurement does not allow any one 
user or class of users to have a disproportionate effect on the 
distribution of funds, can be calculated using publicly available 
data, and distributes funds based entirely on the popularity of 
the work. 
 
B.  OBJECTIONS TO THIS SYSTEM 
1.  Why just music? 
 My proposal assumes that only musical works and sound 
recordings will be included in the compulsory licensing scheme.  
This choice is necessary for both technological and political 
reasons.  First, “audio fingerprinting” technology is not yet 
practical for video files.  Second, the pricing structure of music 
uniquely lends itself to compulsory licensing.  Third, a 
compulsory license scheme for music can be implemented 
without modifying international treaties to which the United 
                                                          
 133. Ax/Fx for each of the works is 0.25, 0.5, 0.3, 0.3, 0.2, 0.2, and 0.2, 
respectively. The sum of A1…n/F1…n, then, is 1.95. The percentage of the pool 
for each work is found by dividing its Ax/Fx value by 1.95. 
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States is a party; this is not true for other types of works.  
Finally, for political reasons, the amount of money paid to 
pornographers should be minimized; excluding video files 
fulfills this goal almost completely. 
First, audio fingerprinting does not work on video files, 
making measurement difficult.  Audio fingerprinting is a 
computationally intensive process.  It works by breaking down 
the audio stream into a number of elements (such as harmonic 
structure, tone, and so on), and then creating a signature that 
uniquely represents those elements.  It is likely that an 
analogous technology for video files could be developed, but it 
would likely be too computationally intensive for home 
computers to perform within an acceptable time frame.  As 
home computers become more powerful, this problem is likely 
to go away. 
Distribution of funds collected for the noncommercial use 
of video files would be more difficult than distribution of funds 
collected for use of audio files because of differences in the 
structure of the music and movie industries.  Nearly all audio 
consumed by the public is available on CDs.  While there is 
some variation among genres, most CDs cost between ten and 
twenty dollars and contain between ten and twenty tracks.  For 
this reason, it is fair to implement a compensation scheme that 
is uniform across musical works and genres.  Video presents 
more problems.  There is a big difference both in the cost of 
producing and the cost of purchasing, say, a funny sixty-second 
animated short and a full-length action movie.  While we could, 
as Fisher suggests, simply pay different rates based on the 
length and genre of the work, this adds a significant amount of 
political complexity to an already politically complex system. 
Third, a compulsory license scheme for music can be 
implemented without modifying international treaties to which 
the United States is a party; this is not true for other types of 
works.  The Berne Convention allows for the compulsory 
licensing of musical works, and does not require protection for 
sound recordings.134  Cinematographic works are protected, 
and are subject to no such exception.135 
Finally, we come to the problem of pornography.  Simply 
put, any legislative proposal that leads the U.S. Government to 
issue large checks to pornographers is doomed.  A considerable 
                                                          
 134. See Berne Convention, supra note 102, at art. 13 § 1 and 11bis 
(allowing compulsory license schemes for musical works). 
 135. See id. at art. 14bis (granting protection to cinematographic works). 
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amount of the video files currently shared on P2P networks 
contain pornography.136  That means that, under any 
popularity-based system of measurement and distribution, 
makers of pornographic videos would receive large sums, since 
pornography is popular.  Given the anti-pornography stance of 
many powerful politicians, major political hurdles exist. One 
can only imagine the indignation some would show at the 
prospect of their money going, even indirectly, to fund 
pornography.  There is no reason to believe that the incidence 
of pornography among P2P-traded video files will go down 
dramatically in the future. 
Why can’t we simply exclude pornography?  It would be 
easy enough to make it a requirement of registration that the 
work is “not pornographic in nature.”  However, problems 
remain.  First, determining what constitutes “pornography” is a 
difficult task, and the margin for error is small.  We could use a 
“harmful to minors” standard, but that would eliminate many 
R-rated movies.  We could use an “obscenity” standard, but that 
would allow all mainstream pornography to be compensated.  I 
suspect that there exists a non-empty set of video content that 
Senator Orrin Hatch would define as “pornographic” and the 
average consumer would define as “non-pornographic,” so the 
political problem seems intractable. 
2.  Let the Music Industry Do the Distribution 
The music industry has long-established methods for 
distributing large pools of revenue fairly among creators and 
copyright holders.  There is no reason that a private authority 
or set of authorities could not administer portions of this 
regime.  ASCAP, BMI, and SoundExchange may, among them, 
be able to better distribute revenues to copyright holders than 
the Copyright Office.  A company like BigChampagne may be 
better equipped to measure the popularity of files on P2P 
networks than a government agency, and more prepared to 
keep up with changes in file sharing software.  This article 
proposes only methods measurement and distribution; it 
matters little who does the actual measuring and distributing.  
                                                          
 136. See generally U.S. House of Representatives Special Investigations 
Division, Children’s Access to Pornography Through Internet File-Sharing 
Programs, at 
http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/20040817153928-
98690.pdf (July 27, 2001) (last visited October 17, 2004) (discussing the 
availability of pornography to children over the Internet). 
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The only part that the government really must do, for obvious 
reasons, is the taxation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
An alternative compensation system based on taxation and 
compulsory licensing will retain the efficiencies of a market 
while eliminating the negative effect of property rights on 
semiotic democracy.  Further, implementing such a system will 
compensate copyright holders who currently receive no 
remuneration for noncommercial P2P sharing of their works.  
No alternative compensation system will mollify all 
stakeholders, but by making policy choices that are 
technologically feasible, economically sound, and in accordance 
with international treaties, such a system will improve 
consumers’ access to culture and creators’ incentives to create. 
 
 
